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Background: Despite the growing interest in the private health sector in low- and middle-income countries, little is
known about physicians working outside the public sector. The present work adopts a mixed-methods approach to
explore characteristics, working patterns, choices, and motivations of the physicians working exclusively for the
private sector in the capital cities of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique. The paper’s objective is to
contribute to the understanding of such physicians, ultimately informing the policies regulating the medical profession
in low- and middle-income countries.
Methods: The qualitative part of the study involved 48 interviews with physicians and health policy-makers and aimed
at understanding the practice in the three locations. The quantitative study included a survey of 329 physicians, and
multivariate analysis was conducted to analyse characteristics, time allocation, earnings, and motivations of those
physicians working only for the private sector, in comparison to their public sector-only and dual practice peers.
Results: Our findings showed that only a limited proportion of physicians in the three locations work exclusively for
the private sector (11.2%), with members of this group being older than those practicing only in the public or in both
sectors. They were found to work fewer hours per week (49 hours) than their public (56 hours) and dual practice peers
(62 hours) (P <0.001 and P = 0.011, respectively). Their median earnings were USD 4,405 per month, with substantial
variations across the three locations. Statistically significant differences were found with the earnings of public-only
physicians (P <0.001), but not with those of the dual practice group (P = 0.340). The qualitative data from the interviews
showed private-only physicians’ preference for an independent and more flexible work modality, and this was quoted
as a determining factor for their choice of sector. This group appears to include those working in the more informal
sector, and those who decided to leave the civil service following a disagreement with the public employer.
Conclusions: The study shows the importance of understanding the relation between health professionals’
characteristics, motivations, and their engagement with the private sector to develop effective policies to regulate the
profession. This may ultimately contribute to achieving universal access to medical services in low- and middle-income
countries.
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The private sector in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) is attracting growing interest as a valid instru-
ment to reach the poor [1,2]. In some sub-Saharan African
countries the emergence of private health services in
urban areas is a relatively recent phenomenon [3], placing
pressure on the public sector to compete for scarce health
workers [4], and creating opportunities for multiple job-
holding [5]. The private health sector in LMICs can be
very diverse and include for-profit and not-for-profit pro-
viders, non-governmental and faith-based organisations
(NGOs), groups and individual providers, and even shop-
keepers [2]; some of these operate within the formal regu-
lated healthcare system, and others on its margins [6].
The literature on qualified private sector physicians
(PSP) in LMICs mainly focuses on the description and
quality of their practice [7,8] and it rarely distinguishes
between those who work exclusively for the private and
those engaging simultaneously with private and public
sector activities, the so-called dual practitioners. Some
scholars have analysed PSPs’ motivations to identify
more effective public sector retention strategies [9,10]. A
study of PSPs’ work satisfaction in South Africa found
that they are overall content with their work conditions,
but dissatisfied with the high proportion of uninsured
patients, low earnings, high administrative burden, and
with the associated pressure to reduce costs [11]. Lonnroth
et al. [12] identified several obstacles to pursue private
employment among PSPs in Vietnam such as the burden
of initial investment, gender discrimination, and regula-
tory barriers. Malik et al. [13] showed that PSP motiv-
ational determinants differ considerably among levels of
care, sectors, and gender in Lahore, Pakistan. Topping up
the public salary to meet the cost of living and supporting
the extended family are found to be main reasons for
engaging with the private sector in Portuguese-speaking
African countries [14]. Russo et al. [15] argue that physi-
cians’ involvement in the private sector in LMICs is more
common than generally assumed, as multiple forms of pri-
vate practice can be found even within public facilities.
Comprehensive research exists from high-income coun-
tries on physicians’ motivations to engage in private sector
practice. These include increasing earning opportunities
and having an entrepreneurial attitude [16], as well as hav-
ing a preference for shorter working hours [17]. These
findings are in line with the work by Midttun [18], who
shows that among Norwegian specialists, a high valuation
of professional values push them towards public employ-
ment [19]. Financial gains and opportunities for out-of-
hours activities are the motivations reported by British
general practitioners for working in the private sector
[20]. In the Netherlands, physicians’ gender and preference
for shorter working hours are found to affect their choice
of practice sector [17].In Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique private
health care was practiced and regulated during the Portu-
guese colonial period, but was momentarily discontinued
by the socialist regimes after independence. Both Guinea
Bissau and Mozambique experienced civil war, which
substantially weakened their health systems. Mozambique
has known peace since 1992, while Guinea Bissau is still
marred by violent political confrontations [21]. In con-
trast, Cape Verde operated a peaceful post-independence
democratic transition, and has recently achieved middle-
income country status [22]. Physician private practices in
Cape Verde are regulated, including within public facilities
[23]. In Mozambique, private health care services regu-
lation is still under development, with ‘special’ private
services being offered within public sector facilities [24].
In Guinea Bissau, private sector regulation is still under-
developed [25], and illegal charges are reported to be
ubiquitous in public facilities [26]. In the three coun-
tries, the opportunities for private sector health care
practice are concentrated in their capital cities, Praia,
Bissau, and Maputo [15].
This paper draws from physicians’ interviews and sur-
vey data collected in the three capital cities, with the
aim of deepening the current understanding of those
physicians working exclusively for the private sector in
LMICs. Our hypothesis is that such motivations can be
adequately explored by contrasting experiences, working
patterns, choice of practice sector, and personal charac-
teristics of the physicians from the three geographical
settings. The ultimate objective of the paper is to pro-
vide an insight for the regulation of the profession and
inform the elaboration of policies to increase population
access to medical services in LMICs.
Methods
This study is based on the secondary analysis of inter-
views and survey data collected between January and
May 2012 in a related study of physician dual practice in
Praia (Cape Verde), Bissau (Guinea Bissau), and Maputo
(Mozambique) [15]. The present study focuses on the
characteristics, working patterns, and motivations of
those physicians working exclusively for the private sec-
tor, in comparison to their dual practice and public
sector-only peers. The three capital cities were selected
because of their similarities in terms of cultural heritage
and health systems, despite the different stages of devel-
opment of their private health sector. The ‘private-only’
group included qualified physicians registered with the
National Medical Associations and working exclusively
for the for-profit private sector or for NGOs and reli-
gious medical organizations; the ‘public-only’ group con-
sisted of those working exclusively for the public; and
the ‘dual practice’ group consisted of those working simul-
taneously in both formal sectors. Other forms of physician
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the health sector, were not considered.
In a first stage, 48 key informants were interviewed;
these were policy-makers and physicians practicing in
the public and private sector in the three capital cities.
The interview guide was elaborated on the basis of the
literature on physician economic behaviour, motivation,
and coping strategies, and explored physicians’ working
time allocation across jobs, motivation and incentives,
and perceptions of regulation of the profession. Qualitative
findings from the interviews were used to design the survey
questionnaire used in the second stage of the study.
For the survey, 329 physicians registered with the
National Medical Associations were randomly selected,
representing 52% of the overall physician population in
the three locations. The full survey’s data collection
methodology is described elsewhere [15]. Physicians
were asked to describe their professional activities in
the previous working week in terms of hours and med-
ical acts performed. To calculate earnings, physicians
were asked about their monthly net salary in the public
sector; to calculate private sector earnings, we multi-
plied the medical acts declared by their average private
sector prices (see Survey Questionnaire in Additional
file 1). Since it emerged that a variable administrative
fee is retained by the clinic where the medical act takes
place, we made the simplifying assumption that physi-
cians only earn 60% of the private service revenues.
Earnings were calculated in local currencies; to make
comparisons possible across the three cities, we con-
verted them to United Stated Dollars (USD) at exchange
rates and purchasing parity power dollars [27]. We con-
sider the limitations of such methodological choices in
the discussion.
Analysis
Interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, manually
coded, and analysed for contents in Portuguese. The cod-
ing tree focused on the identification of key themes and
categories on three main areas, namely: (a) characteristics
of the market for private medical services, (b) current le-
gislation, history, and perceptions of private sector regula-
tion, and (c) physicians’ motivations and incentives to
work in the private and/or public sectors.
Descriptive and multivariate analysis was carried out
in IBM SPSS Statistics – Version 20. For the descriptive
analysis, proportion Z-tests with Bonferroni adjusted
P values were performed in order to determine any pos-
sible differences among the three groups of doctors’ em-
ployment considered. In order to analyse the independence
of variables, χ2 tests were performed and, when the hypoth-
esis of independence was rejected, the corresponding re-
sidual analysis was carried out. When conditions to apply
the χ2 test failed, Fisher’s exact test results were presented.To overcome the failure of normality (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests) and homogeneity of
variances (Levene’s test) necessary for the application
of the t-test when comparing quantitative variables between
the different groups, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis
test was applied and, when appropriate, multiple compari-
sons were presented. All statistical tests were performed
considering a 5% significance level.
Results
Characteristics of private sector physicians (PSPs)
PSPs were found to be a minority in the three locations.
The survey sample of physicians providing clinical ser-
vices included 37 who declared that they worked exclu-
sively in the private sector (11.2%), 42.2% worked only in
the public sector (139), and 46.5% engaged in both sec-
tors (153) (Table 1). In the private-only group there were
fewer men (48.6%) and married physicians (59.5%) than
in the other two groups, with the majority holding a
specialization (73%). Proportion Z-tests with Bonferroni-
adjusted P values did not highlight any statistically sig-
nificant differences between the three types of physicians
with regards to sex, marital status, and specialization.
Location, age, and holding a specialization were found
to be determining factors in physicians’ selection of
practice sector. When looking for association between
variables, χ2 tests rejected the null hypothesis of no
association between the type of employment and the
variables city (P = 0.029) and specialization (Yes/No)
(P <0.001). Kruskal-Wallis test results showed statisti-
cally significant differences in median ages between
physicians in the private sector (51 years) and those in
the public sector (43 years) with a P value of 0.034,
but not among PSPs and dual practitioners, or between
these latter and those from the public sector, with P values
equal to 0.488 and 0.209, respectively. Similarly, only the
differences in the median number of years of practice as
medical doctors between the dual practitioners (12 years)
and the public sector (7 years) were statistically significant
(P = 0.001). For the multiple comparisons regarding the
number of dependents among the three groups, no sta-
tistically significant differences were found (all P values
greater than 0.05).
Work modalities and earnings
A greater proportion of ‘private-only’ physicians were
found to work for their own practice compared to dual
practitioners (27% vs. 20.9%), while a higher percentage
of the latter worked for a practice owned by a colleague
(22.2% vs. 5.4%). Working in a private clinic was the
most common form of employment in both private and
dual practice sectors (40.5% and 53.6%, respectively).
Proportion Z-tests only showed statistically significant
differences between private and dual practitioners when
Table 1 Physicians’ personal characteristics, functions, and modality of work by type of employment
Type of employment
Private Public Dual practice Total
Count % Count % Count % Count %
City
Praia 14 12.8 39 35.80 56 51.40 109 100.00
Maputo 8 6.40 53 42.40 64 51.20 125 100.00
Bissau 15 15.80 47 49.50 33 34.70 95 100.00
Total 37 11.20 139 42.20 153 46.50 329 100.00
Sex (M)* 18 48.60a 74 53.20a 85 55.60a 177 53.80
Civil status (M)* 22 59.50a 100 72.50a 118 77.10a 240 73.20
With a specialization* 27 73.00a 72 51.80ab 115 75.20b 214 65.00
Function
As a clinician* 28 75.70a – – 148 96.70b 176 92.60
As a manager* 6 16.20a – – 13 8.50a 19 10.00
As a consultant* 2 5.40a – – 3 1.30a 5 2.60
Other* 2 5.40a – – 3 1.30a 9 4.70
Modality of work
Own private practice* 10 27.00a – – 32 20.90a 42 22.10
Private practice owned
by colleagues*
2 5.40a – – 34 22.20b 36 18.90
Private clinic* 15 40.50a – – 82 53.60a 97 51.10
Private hospital* 4 10.80a – – 14 9.20a 18 9.50
House visits* 1 2.70a – – 3 2.00a 4 2.10
Other* 7 18.90a – – 13 8.50b 20 10.50
Characteristics Median SD Median SD Median SD Median SD
Age 51 13.68 42 9.74 45 9.51 45 10.24
Number of dependents 2 3.396 3 3.814 3 3.087 3 3.473
Years of work as MD in
the capital city
12 9.37 7 8.933 11 8.742 9 9.016
Note: Totals do not add up to 100%, as functions and modalities of work are not mutually exclusive. *Cells in the same row not sharing the same subscript
indicate proportion differences significant at 5% level in a two-sided test of equality for column proportions.
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other work place (Table 1).
Nine out of ten physicians in our survey sample were
found to engage in clinical private practice, either exclu-
sively or as dual practitioners; twice as many PSPs re-
ported engaging in managerial functions (16.2%) than
their dual practice peers (Table 1). Statistically significant
differences were only found between private-only and
dual practitioners when working as clinicians (Table 1).
PSPs were found to work fewer hours than their peers.
The median amount of hours worked per week by private-
only physicians in our survey sample was 49 hours, 56 hours
for public-only physicians, and 62 hours for dual practi-
tioners (Figure 1). Private-only physicians in Praia re-
ported working the least hours per week (42 hours),
with dual practitioners in Bissau and Maputo reporting
the most (62 hours) (Table 2). The Kruskal-Wallis test
rejected the hypothesis of equal median values for thethree groups (P <0.001). There were statistically significant
differences between private physicians and dual practi-
tioners (P <0.001) and between the latter and the physi-
cians that work in the public sector (P = 0.011). Statistically
significant differences were only found in the PSPs be-
tween the cities of Praia and Bissau (P = 0.016).
The median monthly income of private-only physi-
cians included in the survey was USD 4,405.47 at 2013
exchange rates, with substantial variations across the
three locations. Median income among physicians in the
public sector was significantly lower than that of physi-
cians in the private sector (P <0.001) and dual practice
(P <0.001), but income differences between private-only
and dual practice physicians were not statistically signifi-
cant (Additional file 2: Table S2 in the statistical annex).
Private-only physicians in Maputo were calculated to
make the highest monthly revenues (USD 5,318), with
public-only physicians earning the lowest (USD 481). Such
Figure 1 Mean number of weekly hours worked per location and group of physicians.
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parity USD (Figure 2).
Physicians’ motivations to work in the private sector
A consistent set of positive as well as negative motivations
for working in the private sector emerged from interviewsTable 2 Total hours worked per week, per type of physician
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significance level in a two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test for the equality of the
Figure 2 Median monthly income per location and type of physician.
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between the two job modalities.
“I am the boss of my own business; if I decide I don’t
want to work tomorrow all I have to do is cancel my
appointments”. Private-only physician from Praia
As to the negative aspects of working in the private
sector, PSPs reported private practice’s lack of variety
and a less interesting case-mix, as well as the perceived
lack of professional collaboration with their peers. For
dual practitioners, long working hours, the necessity to
work in multiple settings to secure enough patients, and
the conflicts of interests resulting from the blurred
boundaries between public and private services, were
mentioned as downsides of private sector work.
“This is a very solitary job; the other physicians are no
longer colleagues, they are competitors!”. Private-only
physician from Praia.
In the three locations, interviewees concurred that
the work carried out in the private sector is generally
less sophisticated than in the public, mostly revolving
around outpatient visits, and less reliant on cooperation
and advice from peers. This was attributed to the limited
development of private services especially in Praia and
Bissau.
“All you see in the private sector is kids with a
cold. You don’t meet with your colleagues to discuss
cases, you don’t get training. And if you run into a
complicated diagnosis you refer it back to the
public hospital”. Specialist from the Agostinho
Neto Central Hospital, Praia.When asked about the reasons for engaging with the
private sector, answers from the survey were broadly
consistent with the qualitative findings, with most phy-
sicians reporting “increasing income” as the main factor
for practicing in the private sector (95.5% responding
important or very important), followed by “being able
to decide my workload” (56.4%) and “having time to
work in both sectors” (12.3%). No association was
found between type of employment and the answer
“having time to work on both sectors” (P = 0.415, χ2
test) (See Additional file 2: Table S1 in the statistical
annex).Personal trajectories of private-only physicians
The qualitative interviews allowed the identification of
specific typologies of physicians dedicated exclusively to
private practice: the NGO worker, the foreign physician
with minimum links with national health authorities,
and the senior physician who left the national health
system; the latter was the dominant type in Bissau and
Maputo. Some of the private-only physicians inter-
viewed reported having been originally trained by the
public system and having worked as civil servants, only
to leave the National Healthcare Service (NHS) at a
later stage, attracted by higher salaries and better working
conditions, trading the benefits of long-term but poorly
paid public jobs for shorter-term but better rewarded
positions.
Interviews showed that, while in Guinea Bissau and Cape
Verde leaving the NHS for private jobs is a fairly established
practice, it is only a recent phenomenon in Mozambique,
following the deterioration of public sector working con-
ditions and the dramatic increase in availability of medical
positions in international NGOs.
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treated differently; perhaps we did not have a high salary,
but we were the Ministry of Health, and had several
perks. […] we had a car, fuel, a telephone and a house.
Very recently such perks started disappearing, and one
starts being more vulnerable to the offers from private
institutions”. Senior NGO physicians from Maputo.
The foreign physicians interviewed commented that
Portuguese-speaking African countries have traditionally
benefitted from ideologically-motivated foreign physi-
cians’ technical assistance (cooperantes), especially from
Cuba and the former communist countries, but also
from comparatively richer African countries such as
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and South Africa. These phy-
sicians were reported to have weak ties with the public
sector and with National Medical Associations, operated
underground and with a business model typical of infor-
mal services based on a large volume of patients, little
regulation, and low-prices.
“In the morning I usually see 70–80 patients, then
30–35 in the afternoon. I charge 3000 CFAs if it’s
somebody older than 15, but only if he’s a national;
now, foreign traders, the UN, diplomats, the [price of
an] outpatient visit ranges between 5000 and 15000.
Foreigners…”. Private-only physician from Bissau.
Despite their weak links with the national regulatory
bodies and erratic compliance with the quality standards
of the profession, these private-only physicians were re-
ported to be responding fittingly to the demand for
health care services from patients from the lower segment
of the market. Some of these physicians saw themselves
as competing with public facilities for the lower-end of
the market and offering products of similar quality and
prices. Some of them even reported having offered their
services to the Ministry of Health with the objective of
accessing public sector equipment, infrastructure, and
clientele.
Finally, senior national physicians who abandoned the
public sector to embrace a more entrepreneurial medical
activity said that they were the victims of the evolution
of the healthcare system from a centralized NHS to a
more democratic model integrating public and private
services. All were trained as public physicians, and started
providing private services within public facilities before
the legalization of the private practice; they declared they
would have continued to do so but were either dissuaded
by the responsible regulatory authority or it became too
cumbersome for them to allocate enough working hours
to both private and public practices. Other interviewees
suggested that such physicians were asked to leave the
public as they were taking advantage of the publicinfrastructure and equipment for their own private bene-
fit. Either way, this type of private-only physicians declared
that they would have preferred to keep their public job
and conduct their private practice on the side, but felt
that the regulatory authorities were “persecuting” pri-
vate sector-minded physicians, making it hard to per-
form their private business.
“There are operation theaters here on the island that
are not even switched on in the afternoon, but they
[the government] would not leave us use them […].
We private physicians are widely seen as the ones
eating all the meat and leaving only the bones for the
public sector physicians; it’s like having a cement roof
constantly put on you!”. Private-only physician from
Praia.
Being assigned to a rural facility with no opportunities
for private sector services was considered another cause
for leaving the public sector, with some younger newly
graduated physicians reporting not having even started
working for the public sector because of this.
Discussion
This study aimed at improving the current understand-
ing of characteristics, motivations, choices, and practices
of physicians working exclusively in the private sector.
The quantitative and qualitative evidence from surveys
and interviews in the three African cities show that rela-
tively few physicians work exclusively for the private sec-
tor, that they are older and work shorter hours than
their public sector and dual practice peers, and that
work autonomy and flexibility are the key motivations at
the base of their choice to dedicate exclusively to the
private sector, since earnings are not significantly differ-
ent from those of dual practice physicians.
Our study’s methodological approach is affected by
some limitations. Firstly, we classified physicians in three
categories following their formal employment status.
However, recent research has shown that the current
definition of dual employment is too narrow and should
be expanded to include those public sector physicians
offering special private services within public facilities
[24,28]. Secondly, we calculated private sector earnings
by multiplying medical acts performed in the private
sector by their market prices; on the one hand, such an
approach does not separate between physician revenues,
profits, and costs. On the other, it may be underesti-
mating private sector earnings as other non-clinical
income-generating activities are excluded from the
above calculations.
We found that only a limited proportion of physicians
in the three locations work exclusively for the private
sector (11.2%) with substantial differences across cities,
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titioners, which is broadly consistent with the existing
literature [4,29]. Previous studies have shown how physi-
cians in Maputo enjoy comparatively more opportunities
to engage in multiple professional activities [24,15],
which could help explain why these may be more reluc-
tant to abandon the public sector than their colleagues
in Praia and Bissau. It is also likely that in Praia, as mar-
kets evolve and a clearer distinction between public and
private healthcare services is sought, an increasing num-
ber of physicians find it more efficient to dedicate exclu-
sively to private practice [30]. On the other hand, the
collapse of the public sector health system and the pres-
ence of a large informal sector where physicians can oper-
ate with few restrictions and minimum cost [31], could
offer an explanation for the high proportion of physicians
with no ties to the public sector in Bissau.
Our data show that private-only physicians are older
and work less hours than their public sector and dual
practice peers, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that, as they pass the peak of their careers, physicians
may be less inclined to engage in multiple professional
activities, opting for more flexible and less demanding
private sector work [32]. This would also be supported
by our qualitative findings on motivations and career
trajectories showing that independence and flexibility
are the job characteristics private-only physicians value
the most. Also a hypothesis could be made that, as phy-
sicians grow older, the balance of preference between
work and leisure opportunities shifts towards the latter
[33]. This would have implications for the success of
policies aimed at retaining or attracting back these expe-
rienced professionals into public sector jobs by paying
higher salaries.
We show that private-only physicians’ earnings could
be between four (Praia) and ten times (Bissau) higher
than public sector physicians’ wages. However, our data
do not show significant differences with dual practi-
tioners’ earnings, and this calculation does not even take
into account the tax-free payments these receive from
the private services they often offer inside public facil-
ities [24,26]. This would lend credibility to the hypoth-
esis that increased earning opportunities do not play
such a determinant role in physicians’ decisions to aban-
don the public sector as previously thought, as dual
practice seems to be able to guarantee the same level of
income. If this contradicts the conventional wisdom that
physicians predominantly turn to the private sector for
economic reasons [14], this interpretation is consistent
with the literature on physicians’ preferences for job
characteristics in high-income countries [17,20].
Our qualitative evidence shows that many private-only
physicians who left the NHS claim they would have pre-
ferred to keep a professional relation with the publicsector. This is consistent with the literature on physicians’
motivation suggesting that, despite the poor conditions of-
fered, public sector work still retains much attraction be-
cause of its financial security, the professional values
attached to the public sector [13,18], the more diverse
(and probably more interesting) case-mix of patients, and
the opportunities for training and for establishing reputation
and a professional network [34]. If managed carefully, these
positives could be used to the advantage of those strategies
aimed at retaining physicians into the public service.
Conclusions
Physicians working exclusively for the private sector in
LMICs have received little attention in the literature,
which is remarkable given the interest that private
provision of health care services is attracting. We con-
ducted a secondary analysis of primary data from phys-
ician interviews and surveys from three African capital
cities to deepen the understanding of private-only physi-
cians’ characteristics, time allocation across professional
activities, revenues, and motivations.
In comparison to their public sector and dual practice
peers, our analysis showed that private-only physicians
are predominantly older professionals, working fewer
hours, and dedicating more time to managerial functions,
and these factors seem to be at the root of their preference
for private sector employment. This group appears to in-
clude physicians working in the more informal sector and
those who parted company with the NHS at a later stage
of their career for personal reasons. The study shows the
importance of understanding the relation between health
professionals’ characteristics, motivations, and practice
patterns to develop effective policies to regulate the
market of health professionals and achieve universal
access to medical services in LMICs.
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